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COMMENT 
DON’T MOW OVER THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE:  GUARDING 
AGAINST IMPROPER MODIFICATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS 
PROVIDED IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Employees join a union and allow it to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement because the relationship provides them security during the term of 
the agreement.  In fact, the collective bargaining arrangement generally 
provides security throughout an employee’s relationship with the employer.  
An agreement may even provide benefits into retirement.1  At retirement, 
however, problems may arise, particularly in the area of health and life 
insurance benefits. 
An employee enjoying health and life insurance benefits provided by the 
collective bargaining agreement may believe that these benefits are going to 
last for his or her entire life.  That is, the employee believes the benefits to be 
vested.2  Such benefits would provide a sense of security because the employee 
and, perhaps, the employee’s spouse and family, would be covered for the life 
of the employee.  Unfortunately, this sense of security is often false.  Health 
and life insurance benefits, also known as welfare benefits, are quite fragile 
once the collective bargaining agreement providing them has expired.  
 
 1. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 
157, 160 (1971) (allowing retirees to partake in the employee group health insurance plan by 
contributing the required premiums). 
 2. In case it is unclear, “vested” means that the retiree has a right to receive the benefits and 
the employer has a correlative duty to continue providing the benefits.  See Deering v. Deering, 
437 A.2d 883, 885 (Md. 1981) (stating that a pension is generally regarded as “vested” when the 
minimum term of employment necessary to receive retirement pay has been completed). 
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Employers facing financial ruin or wishing to save money may desire, or even 
be required, to terminate welfare benefits that are received by retirees. 
The contractual nature of the collective bargaining agreement prevents 
revoking the benefits from active employees during the agreement term, but 
retirees present a different situation.  While the retirees may believe that their 
benefits are to last a lifetime, or vest, the actual contractual language may be 
more ambiguous.  In this case, an employer might be able to unilaterally 
terminate the benefits.  A retiree facing such a situation may be devastated 
financially and emotionally.  The union no longer has an obligation to 
represent the individual because he or she has retired,3 and statutory provisions 
protecting the retiree’s pension do not extend to welfare benefits.4 
This was the precise situation facing retirees in United Auto., Aerospace, 
and Agriculture Workers of America  v. Yard-Man.5  In this case, it seemed 
that the employer had decided to terminate welfare benefits when facing 
financial trouble.6  In 1983, the Sixth Circuit prevented the unilateral 
termination, holding that the employer had a contractual duty to continue 
paying the welfare benefits for the life of the retiree.7  It reached this decision 
by using what has come to be known as the Yard-Man inference.8  The 
collective bargaining agreement had expired and was deemed ambiguous by 
the Sixth Circuit.9  In an attempt to discern the parties’ intent as to the vesting 
of benefits, the court decided to use an inference as a factor in making that 
determination.10  The Yard-Man inference follows the following logic: the 
court reasoned that because these were welfare benefits, they were considered 
deferred forms of compensation when the union bargained for them.11  Since it 
was presumable that the employees forewent an increase in their present 
compensation, it would be ridiculous for the parties to leave the welfare 
benefits to the uncertainties of the next collective bargaining agreement.12  
Thus, an inference was raised that the benefits were to vest.  The inference was 
then added to other factors in determining the parties’ intent.13 
Three Circuits have joined the Yard-Man court, while three others have 
split, refusing to use a “gratuitous inference” in determining the parties’ 
 
 3. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 172. 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1994). 
 5. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. 
Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 1482-83. 
 8. See id. at 1482.  See also Shannon P. Duffy, Health Benefits Not for Life, 3rd Circuit 
Says, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1. 
 9. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479. 
 10. See id. at 1482. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
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intentions.14  Most recently, the Third Circuit has joined the splitting circuits in 
rejecting the Yard-Man analysis.15  It is possible that the Supreme Court will 
take up the issue in a future term.16 
The thrust of this Comment will be in support of using the inference as part 
of the larger social policy of providing some type of health insurance for 
retirees who are left rather unprotected by the collective bargaining 
relationship.  With a potentially insolvent Medicare system and rising costs of 
health insurance, the situation for retirees facing the termination of benefits is 
not encouraging.  The Yard-Man inference could be used to maintain benefits 
that an employer initially promised a retiree until Congress adopts better 
legislation in pursuit of the larger social policy of lifetime benefits for all 
retirees. 
Part II of this Comment provides a background of the law surrounding 
collective bargaining, welfare benefits and the Yard-Man decision.17  It also 
discusses the current circuit split in place.18  Part III examines the criticisms of 
the Yard-Man decision19 by briefly summarizing and analyzing each from a 
critical perspective.  Part IV discusses current judicial alternatives to such an 
inference, concluding that any alternative is inadequate in providing sufficient 
protection to the parties’ intentions.20  Finally, Part V demonstrates that the 
Yard-Man is an acceptable analysis.21  In addition, Part V investigates the 
 
 14. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel, 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that the employer was obligated to continue providing benefits after the expiration of the 
labor agreement); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that retiree 
medical and life insurance benefits must be provided beyond the life of the collective bargaining 
agreement); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the former employer, not the successor employer, is obligated to keep retiree benefits current after 
the sale of the company ); International Ass’n of Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (reversing and remanding a district court determination that the company was not 
obligated to provide lifetime benefits to retirees ); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace 
& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3rd Cir. 1999) 
(affirming a lower court’s decision that there is no presumption that parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement intend retiree welfare benefits to continue beyond the expiration of the 
labor agreement). 
 15. See Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 139. 
 16. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 1.  However, while the split may give rise to the Supreme 
Court granting certiorari, it is also possible that there will be no resolution.  The Yard-Man 
inference is used to determine the intent of the union and the employer, and often is applied to 
very different language.  The Supreme Court could deny certiorari based on the fact that it would 
be making a determination based largely on the facts of an individual case. 
 17. See infra  notes 23-215 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra  notes 162-215 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra  notes 216-80 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra  notes 281-344 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra  notes 345-52 and accompanying text. 
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current state of legislation impacting upon this issue and discusses potential 
legislation to relieve the situation faced by retirees.22 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the Yard-Man decision and its applications, one 
must first consider the background to the opinion and the cases making up the 
circuit split.  First, it is helpful to investigate the statutes involved in such a 
decision and how they confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts.  Next, it is 
necessary to discuss the Yard-Man decision and the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals decisions shaping the analysis of this Comment. 
A. Introduction to Jurisdiction, the National Labor Management Relations 
Act and the Early Cases 
1. Jurisdiction 
A reader who is new to the world of labor relations will notice that the 
cases involving the Yard-Man analysis are heard in federal court, yet there is 
little explanation as to how the federal courts maintain jurisdiction.23  A suit 
involving a Yard-Man problem may be brought by retirees or their union under 
§ 301(a) of the National Labor Management Relations Act (“NLMRA”).24  
The NLMRA provides that any suit involving the breach of a contract between 
an employer and a labor organization shall be heard in a district court of 
appropriate jurisdiction.25 
A simple answer to the question of jurisdiction is that the NLMRA confers 
jurisdiction.  However, an astute reader will notice that the federal courts are 
not relying on state common-law principles as most federal courts do when 
deciding contracts cases.26  Rather, the federal courts fashion their own laws 
when working under § 301.27  In some cases, the NLRMA itself provides the 
 
 22. See infra notes 353-66 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 61; Connors Steel, 855 F.2d at 
1500; Textron, 838 F.2d at 7; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 130. 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). 
 25. Id. § 185(a). 
 26. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 61; Connors Steel, 855 F.2d at 
1505; Textron, 838 F.2d at 7; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 130.  Normally, if the federal courts are acting 
under anything other than federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they must 
apply the law as defined in the state from which the case arises.  See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). 
 27. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).  
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, decided that § 301 gave the federal courts more than 
jurisdiction.  The majority concluded that § 301 also provided for the authority to create 
substantive law.  See id.  In addition, the law that was applied under § 301 was federal law.  See 
id. at 456.  Douglas argued that state law could be used as a guide in determining the substantive 
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appropriate substantive law.28  In other cases, a federal court must use “judicial 
inventiveness” to fashion a legal solution to the problem facing the court.29  
Regardless, the court looks to national labor policy when developing 
substantive law.30  Without the ability to fashion federal substantive law, the 
Sixth Circuit could not have created an inference of vested retiree benefits. 
2. The NLRA and Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
The most obvious remedy for a retired union member losing benefits 
seems to be provided by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).31  But, in 
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
the Supreme Court held that the unilateral modification of retiree health 
insurance provided for in a collective bargaining agreement was not prohibited 
by the NLRA, even if the modification occurred during the contract term.32 
The Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass first noted that retirees could not be 
considered “employees” for purposes of the NLRA.33  In addition, retirees 
were not to be considered as part of the bargaining unit represented by the 
union in negotiations with management.34  To support this conclusion, the 
Court reasoned that the interests between the active employees and the retirees 
were not mutual.35  In fact, the Court feared that “union representatives on 
occasion might see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions 
favoring active employees at the expense of retirees’ benefits.”36  In essence, 
the Court decided that because of the discrepancies between the interests of the 
active employees and the retirees, it would be better for the retirees to 
negotiate alone.37 
 
law to be applied to a problem, but once applied the state law was to be subsumed into the federal 
law.  That is, it would become federal law.  Id. at 457. 
 28. See id. at 457. 
 29. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457. 
 30. See id. at 456. 
 31. After all, the NLRA provides that “terms and conditions” of employment are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).  It appears that health and life insurance 
benefits are such conditions of employment.  Usually, management and employees view such 
benefits as deferred compensation, given to the employees rather than an increase in wages, for 
instance.  See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. 
 32. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
188 (1971). 
 33. See id. at 168. 
 34. See id. at 172-73. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 173. 
 37. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). 
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Next, the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Court faced the issue of whether the 
subject of retiree benefits was a mandatory or permissive bargaining term.38  
The NLRA provides that “terms and conditions of employment” are mandatory 
terms.39  The Court decided that health insurance benefits were not “terms and 
conditions of employment” under the NLRA.40  Under previous decisions, the 
Court held that certain terms were mandatory bargaining provisions under the 
NLRA, even if the worker in question was outside the employment 
relationship.41  However, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the decision turned on the 
impact of retiree benefits on active employees.42  The retirees’ benefits did not 
impact the terms and conditions of the employment of active employees to an 
extent that justified recognizing them as mandatory subjects for collective 
bargaining.43 
Finally, the Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass concluded that because the 
benefits were only permissive terms of bargaining, modifying the benefits, 
even in mid-term, was not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.44  Instead, 
the retirees were to seek a remedy in an action for breach of contract.45  Since 
the parties were not required to bargain for the term under the NLRA initially, 
the Court refused to find a violation of the statute (i.e. an unfair labor 
practice).46  Despite one of the parties’ apparent breach of the contract, there 
was no unfair labor practice.47 
 
 38. See id. at 177-82.  In 1958, the Supreme Court held that collective bargaining could take 
place over issues that were not mandated by the NLRA.  See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).  Thus, certain issues must be bargained for, while others are 
simply permissive subjects of bargaining.  See Donald T. Weckstein, The Problematic Provision 
and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 104 
(1987).  Weckstein also noted that Wooster provided for a third category of benefits, including 
those items that were illegal over which to bargain.  See id. 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). 
 40. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 182. 
 41. See id. at 178 (citing Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959)).  Oliver involved 
anti-trust laws and the establishment of minimum rent payments that carriers would pay to truck 
drivers that owned their own truck.  The Court ignored the issue of whether the truck owners 
were employees and held that the rent payment was a mandatory term of the bargaining 
agreement, and thus immune from state anti-trust laws.  See id. 
 42. See id. at 180. 
 43. See id.  It had been argued that the employer and active employees would receive the 
benefit of lower costs for health insurance because adding the retirees would increase the size of 
the group and thereby lower rates.  The Court noted that there was no guarantee that the retirees 
would not increase the cost because of their higher medical expenses.  Id. 
 44. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 188. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 187. 
 47. See id. 
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Thus, retirees could not pursue a claim against an employer who modified 
their benefits through their union under the NLRA.48  Rather, the Court forced 
retirees to pursue claims under § 301 of the NLRMA for breach of contract.49  
In writing the opinion for Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Justice Brennan pointed out 
that in his opinion such a remedy provided the retirees with adequate 
protection.50  Unfortunately, Brennan could not foresee the problems for 
retirees who lack representation and try to pursue a claim under general 
contract principles. 
3. Recent Trends and Statistics 
Recent trends in employer-provided health insurance for retirees are quite 
disturbing.  At one time, health insurance was considered a low-cost benefit, 
but now the costs have risen sharply.51  A Department of Labor study 
attributed this spike in costs to an aging population and rising medical costs.52  
In response to the rising costs, employers began terminating such benefits, not 
just for retirees, but across the board.  In 1991, forty-nine percent of employees 
participating in an employer provided medical benefits plan were not required 
to pay contributions.53  In 1997, only thirty-one percent of employees were not 
required to pay a contribution in order to participate in such a plan.54  Thus, 
while employers may be maintaining benefit plans, a greater percentage of 
employers now require the employees to pay the fees. 
Such trends were accelerated in 1990, when the Federal Accounting 
Standards Board changed its regulations and required employers to recognize 
the cost of retiree insurance when the cost is incurred, rather than deferring 
recognition until the future liabilities are realized.55  In firms with a high ratio 
of retirees to active employees, this represented a large increase in costs.  Thus, 
companies began facing financial difficulties in providing for retirees.56 
An individual who retires before the age of sixty-five faces a severe plight 
when a company terminates health insurance benefits after the expiration of a 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 188. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Jeannette A. Rogowski & Lynn A. Karoly, Study 10: Retirement and Health Insurance 
Coverage, HEALTH BENEFITS AND THE WORK FORCE  117 ( 1992). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey Table 5.  Percent of full-time 
employees participating in employer-sponsored medical benefits by type of medical plan and 
requirement for employee contributions, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997, available at 
http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/ebs3.t05.htm (last modified Nov. 10, 1999). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Gregory J. Ossi, It Doesn’t Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health 
Benefits, Medicare, and Accounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical Coverage 
for Retirees, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233-34 (1996). 
 56. See Rogowski & Karoly, supra note 51, at 117. 
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collective bargaining agreement.  In such case, there is a gap between the 
termination and the onset of Medicare benefits.  Because of the strong 
economy and aging population, this has become a common trend.57  However, 
retirees who wait until the age of sixty-five to retire may also face economic 
hardship when a former employer cuts welfare benefits, which the retiree 
believed were supposed to last a lifetime.  Medicare only covers about fifty 
percent of a person’s medical expenses.58  In addition, Medicare does not cover 
certain costs, such as long-term hospitalization.59  Thus, retirees must find 
supplemental coverage.  If the retiree has received insurance through a former 
employer since retiring, a search for affordable supplemental coverage may be 
a daunting task.  In addition, the issue of an insolvent Medicare system has 
arisen in recent years.60 
B. The Yard-Man Decision 
The Yard-Man incidents began in 1974.61  Yard-Man, Inc. and the United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
(U.A.W.) signed a collective bargaining agreement in 1974.62  The agreement 
covered employees at the Yard-Man, Inc. plant in Jackson, Michigan.63  The 
agreement lasted three years, expiring in 1977,64 and provided that when a 
retired employee turned sixty-five years of age, the company would pay 
insurance benefits equal to those received by active employees.65 
Unfortunately, the plant closed in 1975, and all employees were 
discharged.66  However, under the terms of the agreement, sixty-five-year old 
retired workers continued receiving the benefits provided for in the 
agreement.67  In 1977, the company notified the Jackson, Michigan retirees 
that they would no longer be receiving those benefits once the agreement 
expired.68  The U.A.W. filed a grievance under § 301 claiming that the 
termination of the benefits constituted a breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement.69 
 
 57. See id. 
 58. AARP, THE PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA 1999 6-1 (1999). 
 59. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 257 n.207. 
 60. See id. at 257. 
 61. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (Cin. Cir. 1983). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 1480. 
 66. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id.  The U.A.W. also filed a second count, which was also dealt with by the Sixth 
Circuit.  See id.  When Yard-Man closed the plant, it offered to pay the employees a lump sum of 
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Initially, the union waived arbitration, and at trial, Yard-Man and the union 
moved for summary judgment.70  The trial judge granted the union’s motion, 
finding that the company had violated the terms of the contract by terminating 
the benefits at the end of the contract.71  The trial judge reasoned that the 
benefits were to last for the entire life of the retiree.72  That is, the benefits 
vested upon the retiree attaining the age of sixty-five.73 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that general 
contract principles are to be used so long as they are consistent with national 
labor policies.74  Generally, the issue of whether the benefits would continue 
beyond the expiration of the agreement depended upon the intent of the 
parties.75 
The court continued by listing contract principles relevant in deciding 
whether the parties intended the benefits to vest.76  The court reasoned that the 
language of the collective bargaining agreement must be searched for 
unambiguous demonstrations of intent.77  However, in order to understand the 
language, the court stated that it must look to the context giving rise to that 
language.78  Generally, that language must be read in light of the contract as a 
whole, and no part should be interpreted as rendering another nugatory.79  If 
the term is ambiguous, the court must look to other parts of the contract to shed 
light on the ambiguity.80  Finally, considerations must be made for national 
labor policies.81 
With this stated, the court applied the contract principles to the provision 
of the collective bargaining agreement, which conferred welfare benefits upon 
retirees.82  The court found the language ambiguous because it stated that the 
retiree would receive benefits equal to those received by the active group of 
 
the present value of certain pension rights.  See id. at 1478.  The retirees overwhelmingly 
accepted this offer, but the U.A.W. requested specific performance of Yard-Man’s obligation to 
purchase annuities to cover these pensions.  See id.  The court, reversing the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the U.A.W., held that genuine issues of material fact existed for a 
jury as to whether Yard-Man’s payment of lump sums created accord and satisfaction concerning 
its obligations to purchase annuities.  See id. at 1488. 
 70. See id. at 1478. 
 71. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. at 1479 (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 
456 (1957)). 
 75. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 1479-80. 
 80. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d. at 1480. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
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employees.83  The court held that this could be interpreted in two ways: (1) as a 
reference only to the nature of the benefits; or (2) as incorporating the 
durational limits of the active group.84  Regardless, the language was unclear 
whether the benefits were to last the lifetime of the retiree or were to terminate 
with the collective bargaining agreement.85 
Because of the ambiguity, the court looked to other parts of the contract 
and to national labor policy.86  The court found that the durational language of 
the provisions for active- employee benefits was inapplicable to retirees.87  In 
addition, the employer’s behavior was not consistent with the interpretation 
that the contract term was meant to include the duration of the active group.88  
Once the plant closed, the active employees’ benefits were discontinued.89  
There was no provision protecting the employees if they left before 
retirement.90  However, the retirees continued to receive benefits after the plant 
closed.91  If the contract was intended to incorporate the same duration as 
active-employees’ benefits, then the company would have terminated the 
retiree benefits immediately upon closing the facility as it did with the active 
employees.92 
The provisions for health insurance were limited in the event that the 
retiree died.93  This fact raised a reasonable inference that the “spouse-
dependent child provision was meant as an exception to the anticipated 
continuation of benefits beyond the life of the collective bargaining 
agreement.”94 
In addition, the collective bargaining agreement allowed an early 
retirement at age fifty- five, but retirees could not claim benefits until age 
sixty-five.95  Applying the principle that no contract term should be interpreted 
in a way that renders another nugatory or illusory,96 the court reasoned that if 
someone retired at age fifty-five, that person had to pay for insurance until 
attaining the age of sixty-five.  After age sixty-five, the company’s promised 
benefits took effect.97  “If retiree benefits were terminated at the end of the 
 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480. 
 86. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 1480. 
 97. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481. 
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collective bargaining agreement’s three-year term, this promise is completely 
illusory for many early retirees under the age of 62.”98 
The crux of the debate surrounding Yard-Man focuses on the court’s last 
point.99  The court held that “the finding of an intent to create interminable 
rights to retiree insurance benefits in the absence of explicit language, is not, in 
any discernible way, inconsistent with federal labor law.”100  Parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement generally understand retiree benefits to be 
deferred forms of compensation and only a permissive topic for bargaining.101  
Thus, reasonable parties would not leave them to such an uncertain future as 
being contingent on future negotiations.102  For this reason, the court stated that 
these benefits carried a special “status,” and they would, in the absence of 
explicit language, create an inference that the parties intended the benefits to 
last the entire life of the retiree.103 
It is important to note that the Sixth Circuit did not create a presumption in 
favor of vested benefits in every case.104  That is, the inference created by the 
context of the collective bargaining agreement does not shift the burden of 
proof to the employer.105  A presumption would be unfair for employers who 
may never have intended welfare benefits to vest and later found themselves in 
financial trouble.106  Instead, the burden of proof is still upon the retirees to 
demonstrate that, more likely than not, the parties intended the benefits to 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 1482. 
 100. Id.  “The employees [were] presumably aware that the union owe[d] no obligation to 
bargain for continued benefits for retirees.  If they fore[went] wages now in expectation of retiree 
benefits, they would [have] want[ed] assurance that once they retire[d] they [would] continue to 
receive such benefits regardless of the bargain reached in subsequent agreements.”  Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id.  The Sixth Circuit actually reversed a case in which the district court held that 
health insurance benefits vest as a matter of federal common law, regardless of the collective 
bargaining agreement’s terms.  See Michael S. Melbinger & Marianne W. Culver, The Battle of 
the Rust Belt: Employer’s Rights to Modify the Medical Benefits of Retirees, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 
139, 145 (1992-1993) (citing Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 42 B.R. 1005, 1016-19 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984), rev’d, In Re White Farm Equip Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 105. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.  “This is not to say that retiree insurance benefits are 
necessarily interminable by their nature.  Nor does any federal labor policy identified to this 
Court presumptively favor the finding of interminable rights to retiree insurance benefits when 
the collective bargaining agreement is silent.”  Id. 
 106. It is not the intent of this Comment to suggest that welfare benefits should vest in every 
collective bargaining agreement with ambiguous language.  A presumption in favor of vested 
benefits would come close to doing this.  Instead, it is only suggested that the Yard-Man inference 
is a method for forcing employers to live up to the agreement originally struck with the union and 
employees. 
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vest.107  The inference may or may not be created by the context of the 
agreement.108  It is this final part of the Yard-Man analysis that provides the 
subject of this Comment. 
C. The Development of the Analysis in the 6th Circuit 
The inference has seen the most development in the circuit in which it 
originated.109  Yard-Man’s use in other circuits that adopted the inference has 
not been as widespread.110  Because much criticism focuses on the dangers 
involved in the potentially broad development of the analysis, it will be helpful 
to discuss how the Sixth Circuit has analyzed similar problems since the initial 
decision. 
Just one year after Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit took up the same issue in 
Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc.111  An employer had again ceased to provide 
health and life insurance benefits to retirees after a collective bargaining 
agreement expired.112  The court, applying Yard-Man, found that the company 
breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in cutting the 
benefits.113  The court, after finding ambiguity in the terms of the agreement, 
again turned to the intent of the parties.114 
However, upon an initial read, it would appear that the court broadened the 
inference into a presumption in favor of vested rights.115  In fact, the court 
focused on the language in Yard-Man which stated that “when parties contract 
for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there is an 
inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue so long as 
the beneficiary remains a retiree.”116  This makes it sound as if the mere 
existence of welfare benefits along with ambiguous language in the agreement 
alone would be enough to vest the benefits in the retirees.117 
 
 107. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 
1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 108. See Yard-Man at 1482. 
 109. See Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 1985); Armistead v. 
Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1293-97 (6th Cir. 1991); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 
654-56 (6th Cir. 1996); Fox v. Varity Corp., No. 95-1730, 1996 WL 382272, at *2 (6th Cir. July 
5, 1996); International Union v. Loral Corp., No. 92-02391, 1997 WL 49077, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 
3, 1997). 
 110. See infra notes 126-58 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 669-77. 
 112. See id. at 670-71. 
 113. See id. at 676. 
 114. See id. at 672. 
 115. See id. at 672-76.  The court indicated at the beginning of this analysis that such retiree 
benefits are normally vested.  Id. at 672. 
 116. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676 (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1489). 
 117. See id. 
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Actually, the court continued to interpret the inference as an inference.  
The court stated, “in light of the insurance provisions’ conditioning the grant of 
retiree insurance benefits only on the retiree’s remaining retired and 
unemployed, and in light of the parties’ failure to specify that retiree insurance 
benefits expired with the termination of the collective bargaining agreements, 
we hold that the general termination clause does not support a finding that 
retiree benefits ended when the agreements expired.”118  Thus, the court 
continued Yard-Man’s trend of considering the existence of retiree benefits in 
light of other factors. 119  The court also considered the language and absence 
of certain language in the collective bargaining agreement in concluding that 
the parties must have intended vested benefits.120 
In 1991, the Sixth Circuit took another case involving the termination of 
welfare benefits paid to retirees in accordance with collective bargaining 
agreements.121  In Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., the court again found for the 
retirees and did so on the basis of the deferred compensation argument used in 
Yard-Man.122  The court never stated that the existence of welfare benefits 
alone was enough to establish vested benefits. 
Perhaps the clearest interpretation of the inference came in Golden v. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co.123  In reviewing a preliminary injunction, the court held that 
the employees could likely show that the employer breached its contractual 
obligations by terminating benefits received by retirees and the spouses of 
deceased retirees.124  The court was clear that “Yard-Man does not shift the 
burden of proof to the employer, nor does it require specific anti-vesting 
language before a court can find that the parties did not intend the benefits to 
vest.”125  The court instead sought to use the inference and other factors as 
guides in discerning the parties’ intent.126 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 122. See id. at 1297.  “A basic premise of the Yard-Man, that retirement insurance benefits 
are a form of deferred compensation applies equally to this case.  Because these benefits are 
deferred compensation, it is unreasonable to suppose that the parties to the [collective bargaining 
agreement] intended to permit Vernitron to terminate the retirement insurance program 
unilaterally.”  Id. 
 123. See Golden v. Kelsoy-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 654-56 (6th Cir. 1996).  The Golden court 
was faced with the issue of whether or not to affirm the District Court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction preventing the employer from terminating benefits.  See id. at 651-52.  As one element 
of a preliminary injunction, the court had to decide if the plaintiff-retirees were likely to succeed 
on the merits.  See id. at 653.  Thus, the court had to apply the Yard-Man analysis.  See id. at 653-
56. 
 124. See id. at 657. 
 125. Id. at 656. 
 126. See id. 
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The Sixth Circuit continues to use this analysis in deciding cases involving 
the termination or modification of welfare benefits provided for in collective 
bargaining agreements.127  In addition, other circuits have also adopted the 
analysis. 
D. The Yard-Man Inference Used in Other Circuits 
In 1987, four years after the Yard-Man decision, the First Circuit faced a 
similar issue.128  In Textron, the Steelworkers Union became embroiled in a 
dispute with Textron, Inc.  Textron sold a division to another company that 
agreed to assume liability of the welfare benefits in question.129  The Union 
requested that Textron guarantee the payment of benefits, and after Textron 
refused, the Union filed a grievance seeking arbitration.130  In the meantime, 
the new company paid the benefits for a few months, but stopped once it 
experienced business problems.131 
The Union successfully obtained a preliminary injunction requiring 
Textron to pay for the benefits.132  The court noted one element that must be 
shown when requesting a preliminary injunction is the likely success of the 
party on the merits.133  While the court noted that Textron might be able to 
succeed by showing an intent to terminate the benefits through the durational 
language of the collective bargaining agreement, it cited with approval Yard-
Man’s characterization of welfare benefits as “status” benefits.134  Because of 
the strength of the Union’s argument using a Yard-Man analysis, the court held 
that the preliminary injunction was properly granted.135 
 
 127. See Fox v. Varity Corp., No. 95-1730, 1996 WL 38227, at *2 (6th Cir. July 5, 1996) 
(reviewing a preliminary injunction); International Union v. Loral Corp., No. 92-02391, 1997 WL 
49077, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 1997) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the inference could 
only be used when the employer attempted to terminate, rather than modify, retirees’ welfare 
benefits). 
 128. See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1987).  
Although the opinion is not an explicit affirmation of the Yard-Man inference, the case revolved 
around the issue of whether a preliminary injunction was properly granted, and the relevant 
standard is whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits. 
 129. See id. at 7. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Textron, 838 F.2d at 7  (citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 
F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981)). 
 134. Id. at 9 (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1007 (1984)). 
 135. See id. at 10. 
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In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit also joined in affirming the Yard-Man 
analysis in United Steelworkers of America v. Connors Steel Co.136  Connors 
Steel Company, a subsidiary of H.K. Porter, terminated retiree benefits that 
had been provided since the execution of a collective bargaining agreement in 
1974.137  Connors began encountering financial trouble in 1979.138  Each 
collective bargaining agreement, signed during the relevant time periods, lasted 
three years before being renegotiated.139  A Connors plant in Alabama was 
unable to execute a collective bargaining agreement with the union to replace a 
1980 agreement.140  In 1983, Connors notified retirees that it intended to cut 
health insurance benefits upon the expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement in 1984.141 
The provision that provided health insurance benefits for retirees was quite 
clear as to the parties’ intent.  It stated that the benefits were to be paid as long 
as the retiree remained retired, “notwithstanding the expiration of [the 
collective bargaining] agreement.”142  Thus, the case could have been decided 
on the language alone.143  However, in dicta, the court went on to cite the 
Yard-Man inference with approval.144  In general, the court stated that the 
language here was much clearer than the language involved in Yard-Man.145  
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the general duration of the 
contract should not support a finding that retiree benefits expire with the 
collective bargaining agreement, even when the language of the benefits 
provision is ambiguous.146  The court emphatically stated: “We fully concur 
with the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.”147 
A year later, the Fourth Circuit joined the Sixth more explicitly.148  Keffer 
v. H.K. Porter Co. involved the same parties with nearly identical facts as 
Connors Steel.149  The only differences were  the location of the plant and the 
fact that the retirees brought suit rather than the union.150  Here, the retirees 
were granted summary judgment in the district court, which held that the 
 
 136. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel, 855 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
 137. See id. at 1500-01. 
 138. See id. at 1501. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Connors Steel, 855 F.3d at 1501. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. at 1504-05. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Connors Steel, 855 F.3d at 1505. 
 147. Id. at 1505. 
 148. See Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 149. See id. at 61. 
 150. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
276 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:261 
Steelworkers Union and H.K. Porter had intended the benefits to vest upon 
retirement.151  The court also ruled that Connors was an agent of H.K. Porter, 
and thus, H.K. Porter could be liable for Connors’ operation.152 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.153  The court first 
focused on the language of the contract provisions specifying the benefits.154  
Generally, the court found that the language supported the district court’s 
conclusion that the parties intended the benefits to vest upon retirement.155  
However, the circuit court then turned to Yard-Man stating that “[s]uch a 
determination is also consistent with a more far-reaching understanding of the 
context in which retiree benefits arise.”156 
Just as the Yard-Man court reasoned, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it 
would be ridiculous to presume that the benefits did not vest.157  After all, 
employers and employees generally understand retiree benefits as deferred 
forms of compensation.  In addition, they are not mandatory subjects for 
bargaining.158  Thus, no reasonable party to the contract would believe that the 
compensation was to “be left to the contingencies of future negotiations.”159  
Because the employees would want assurance that the deferred compensation 
would come through when they retired, it is reasonable to presume that the 
parties intended that the benefits vest upon retirement.160  The Fourth Circuit 
went on to hold that because Connors Steel was an agent of H.K. Porter, H.K. 
Porter was liable for the costs of the benefits.161 
Thus, four circuits have provided affirmations of the inference.  However, 
just as quickly as the First, Fourth and Eleventh affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis, other circuits were quick to split and criticize the inference of vesting 
benefits. 
E. The Formation of a Solid Split Among the Circuits 
The first real criticism of Yard-Man came in 1988.  The Eighth Circuit, in 
Anderson v. Portland Indus., decided that it was “not at all inconsistent with 
labor policy to require the plaintiffs to prove their case without the aid of 
 
 151. See id. at 62. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 65. 
 154. See id. at 62. 
 155. See id. at 63. 
 156. Id. at 64. 
 157. See id. (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1007 (1984)). 
 158. See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64 (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482). 
 159. Id.  (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. at 65. 
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gratuitous inferences.”162  In this case, retirees brought a class action suit 
against their former employer, Alpha Portland.163  Alpha Portland provided 
health care coverage since the 1950s.164  Many of the collective bargaining 
agreements provided for rather explicit terms that allowed the employer to 
terminate or modify health insurance after the collective bargaining agreement 
providing those benefits expired.165  However, this case involved an added 
element. 
In 1974, Congress passed the Economic Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”).  ERISA provides certain disclosure and vesting requirements for 
benefits plans.166  However, while ERISA requires the vesting of pension 
plans, it does not require the vesting of welfare benefits,167 which include life 
and health insurance coverage.168  As stated above, the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement may bargain for vested benefits.169 
In Anderson, the company and union negotiated their final collective 
bargaining agreement in 1978.170  As part of ERISA’s requirements, a 
summary plan description (“SPD”) was distributed to employees.171  The SPD 
provided employees with ten years or more of service would continue to 
receive health coverage for the remainder of their lives.172  However, previous 
statements of that type had been understood by the company to mean that the 
employee’s family would not receive the benefits in the event of the retiree’s 
death.173  The language of the 1978 agreement was ambiguous at best, and 
testimony revealed that a deceased company representative had indicated that 
the benefits were to vest upon achieving ten years of service.174 
 
 162. Anderson  v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 163. See id. at 1513. 
 164. See id. at 1513-14. 
 165. See id. at 1514.  The language varied, but that “Alpha reserved ‘the right to change, 
modify, or discontinue’ the plan” was a common provision from the beginning of the bargaining 
relationship.  See id. 
 166. See id. at 1516 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994)). 
 167. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1516 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994)). 
 168. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). 
 169. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) 
(citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964)).  In Livingston, Justice 
Harlan wrote: “We see no reason why parties could not if they so chose agree to the accrual of 
rights during the term of an agreement and their realization after the agreement had expired.” 
Livingston, 376 U.S. at 555. 
 170. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id.  The SPD also provided that the company would continue to provide $4,000 
yearly in life insurance.  Id. 
 173. See id. at 1514. 
 174. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515. 
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In 1982, the agreement expired, and Alpha Portland was forced to close all 
of its plants.175  In March, it notified retirees that their health and life insurance 
benefits were to be terminated.176  Adding to the confusion, the union president 
sent a letter informing retirees that the union’s hands were tied because health 
insurance benefits did not vest under the last collective bargaining 
agreement.177  Thus, the retirees brought suit in a class action without union 
representation.  The district court, in a bench trial, concluded that the benefits 
had not vested and were vulnerable to termination by Alpha Portland.178 
The court, once it determined that the provisions providing welfare 
benefits to retirees were ambiguous as to vesting, turned to the intent of the 
parties.179  The plaintiffs argued that the mere existence of welfare benefits 
created a presumption that the benefits vested, and that the burden of proof 
shifted to the employer to show clear language to the contrary.180  This 
interpretation of Yard-Man then led the court to reject the idea of inferring 
vested rights from the context of the collective bargaining agreement.  First, 
the court held that even if it “recognize[d] an inference in favor of vesting, the 
burden of proof still remain[ed] on the plaintiffs. . . . Inferences do not shift the 
burden of proof.”181 
Next, the court rejected the favorable inference entirely.182  This argument 
centered on the fact that ERISA explicitly exempted welfare benefits from its 
vesting requirements.183  Because Congress demonstrated an explicit intent not 
to allow the automatic vesting of welfare benefits, “it, therefore, seems 
illogical to infer an intent to vest welfare benefits in every situation where an 
employee is eligible to receive them on the day he retires.”184  Thus, the court 
 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 1515-16.  Although it is pure speculation, this could be an example of the fear 
of a union forced to drop retirees because of a need to work harder for active employees 
expressed by Justice Brennan in Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. 
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1971). 
 178. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1513. 
 179. Id. at 1516. 
 180. See id. at 1516.  This is a misread of Yard-Man.  See supra notes 102-06 and 
accompanying text.  Yard-Man is clear that because the union does not have to bargain for these 
rights, and the rights are normally understood to be deferred compensation, the court held that it 
was not inconsistent with national labor policy to infer that the parties intended vested benefits.  
See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. 
Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).  In fact, the court went on to say that no 
“federal labor policy identified . . . presumptively favor [sic] the finding of interminable rights to 
retiree insurance benefits when the collective bargaining agreement is silent.  Id.  Yard-Man only 
established an inference rather than a presumption, which shifts the burden of proof.  Id. 
 181. Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] DON’T MOW OVER THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE 279 
did not grant the plaintiffs a favorable inference.  Instead, turning to the 
language of earlier decisions of the Eighth Circuit, the court indicated that any 
intent to vest the retirement benefits must be clear and specific from the 
contract.185 
The most recent rejection of the Yard-Man inference builds upon the 
arguments of Anderson.  However, the Third Circuit, in International Union v. 
Skinner Engine Co., spent much more time dealing with the inference created 
by Yard-Man.186  The U.A.W. executed collective bargaining agreements with 
Skinner beginning in 1970.187  Each of the agreements provided that retirees 
would continue to receive benefits after they retired, but they were silent as to 
the duration.188  Likewise, all the collective bargaining agreements contained 
general duration provisions that were normally three years in length.189 
As in previous cases, Skinner ran into financial trouble, but not to the 
extent that it was forced to shut down.  In fact, the trouble would not have 
arisen but for a decision made by the Financial Accounting and Standards 
Board (“FASB”).190  The FASB issued an order, No. 106, in 1991.191  It 
provided that companies would have to recognize the costs of post-retirement 
benefits as employees rendered services rather than when they were paid.192  
Thus, Skinner felt it financially wise to cut the benefits being paid to retirees 
who were covered by collective bargaining agreements that had expired.193  
The union and the retirees filed a class action against Skinner under § 301 of 
the NLRMA.194 
After the district court granted summary judgment to Skinner, the union 
and retirees appealed to the Third Circuit.195  On August 10, 1999, the Third 
Circuit handed down its decision explicitly rejecting any inferences in favor of 
vested rights.196  Like the Eighth Circuit in Anderson, the court followed Yard-
Man’s analysis of the provisions until arriving at the union’s argument that the 
benefits raised an inference that they were vested.197 
 
 185. See id. (citing Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 1987) and 
UFCW Local 105-A v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 70 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
 186. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139-41 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 187. See id. at 134. 
 188. See id. at 135. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 136. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. at 136-37. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 142. 
 197. See id. at 137-39. 
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Unlike the Anderson court, however, the Third Circuit divided the Yard-
Man inference into two parts.  First, the Sixth Circuit, according to the Skinner 
court, had rested its decision on the fact that retirement benefits are ordinarily 
vested because the benefit terms are only permissive and take the form of 
deferred compensation.198  Thus, the parties would not logically intend to leave 
them to the uncertain contingency of negotiation.199  Next, the court claimed 
that the Sixth Circuit had created a presumption in favor of vested rights to 
welfare benefits because the Yard-Man court had declared them to be “status” 
benefits.200 
The court quickly rejected any notion of a presumption.  The argument 
against a presumption that shifted the burden of proof was based on the Eighth 
Circuit’s argument that ERISA’s explicit exemption of welfare benefits from 
its vesting requirements precluded a presumption that parties intended the 
benefits to vest.201  In fact, the court went so far as to say that “because vesting 
of welfare benefits constitutes an extra-ERISA commitment, an employer’s 
commitment to vest such benefits is not to be inferred lightly and must be 
stated in clear and express language.”202 
The court went on to reject the argument that because the provisions were 
only permissive, rather than mandatory, the court should infer that the parties 
intended the benefits to vest.203  Here, the court turned to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator.204 
In Bidlack, the Seventh Circuit faced a similar issue involving retiree 
welfare benefits, but the court did not directly address the Yard-Man 
inference.205  Instead, the court reasoned, in an opinion by Judge Richard 
Posner, that in one sense, one could argue that the benefits should not vest 
because the union would never bargain for retiree benefits.206  It would have no 
reason to do so because the retirees did not pay benefits or contribute to the 
union.207  One could also argue that because the current employees that will 
retire under the current collective bargaining agreement would want the 
benefits to vest, they would have lobbied the union to bargain for vested 
 
 198. See id. at 140. 
 199. See id. (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1007 (1984)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140-41. 
 202. Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
 203. See id. at 141. 
 204. See id. (citing Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).  
It should not be overlooked that this opinion was written by the founder of law and economics, 
Judge Richard Posner. 
 205. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609-10. 
 206. See id. at 609. 
 207. See id. 
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benefits.208  Thus, the parties could have intended vested benefits.209  Because 
the contract was ambiguous and the intent of the parties unclear, the Seventh 
Circuit refused to grant summary judgment to either party and remanded the 
case for a jury to make the determination.210 
The Third Circuit, rather than remanding for a jury determination, used 
Posner’s argument to support its position that the Yard-Man inference should 
not be used in determining the parties’ intent.211  In either of Posner’s 
situations, the Third Circuit indicated that the current employees have the 
burden to lobby the union for vested benefits.212  Thus, if the language is not 
clear, the benefits should not vest.213  After applying general contract 
principles, the court held that the parties did not intend the benefits to vest 
upon retirement and granted summary judgment in favor of Skinner.214 
This decision has created a solid split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals.  Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue, litigants 
are forced to fit their case within the law of the particular circuit in which they 
lie.215 
The background that has been provided in Section II of this Comment will 
serve in understanding the analysis.  Not only are the principles of law 
established in each case important to the analysis, but the facts of the cases are 
also important.  The combination of facts and law show that the Yard-Man 
 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. at 610. 
 210. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609.  Judge Posner based his decision not to infer vested rights 
on grounds that a jury would be best suited to resolve a dispute over the parties’ intent.  Id.  “Only 
a posture, not easy to reconcile with the Seventh Amendment, of extreme mistrust of juries would 
entitle us to permit a factual inquiry and apply an interpretive canon or other tie-breaker before 
we know that the sides are actually tied.”  Id. 
 211. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 147.  The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the employer breached 
its fiduciary duty under ERISA.  See id. at 147-51.  Finally, the court rejected an argument based 
on equitable estoppel.  See id. at 151-52.  These latter analyses will be further discussed when 
evaluating alternative arguments upon which retirees may rest a claim when their welfare benefits 
are unilaterally terminated or modified. 
 215. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 1.  The Skinner decision could ultimately be determined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court thus settling the rule unless Congress makes a determination that a 
statute is necessary.  Id.  The Supreme Court has held that an employer that is not subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement may provide for the amendment of welfare benefits using a 
standard provision in the ERISA summary plan description.  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995).  The Court has also noted that the courts may find that 
parties provided for vested benefits through contractual interpretation.  Litton Fin. Printing Div. 
v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 207-08 (1991).  The Court has not ruled on the issue of whether an 
employer may alter or terminate welfare benefits provided for in a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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principle should not be scrapped by the courts until some better alternative is 
established in the way of legislation. 
III. YARD-MAN’S UNFOUNDED CRITICISM 
The Yard-Man decision has been criticized by both the courts and the 
commentators.216  Now that the background of the issue has been discussed, it 
will be helpful to analyze common criticisms of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.  
Each criticism, whether it originates in the courts or in commentary, will be 
evaluated with a focus on showing that the inference is not inconsistent with 
solid legal principles.  In addition, any problem with the inference is 
overshadowed by a retiree’s loss of health care coverage or life insurance when 
that retiree had expected the benefits to vest upon retirement.  As will be 
demonstrated, the criticisms do not require the elimination of the principle and 
are generally outweighed by the inference’s necessity. 
A. Criticism in the Courts 
It has already been shown that the criticism of Yard-Man began in the 
Eighth Circuit with Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus.217  There, the Eighth 
Circuit’s main criticism of the inference was that the retirees should not be 
afforded a “gratuitous inference” because it cut against the congressional intent 
in passing ERISA without vesting requirements for welfare benefits. 218  The 
court stated that because Congress explicitly exempted welfare benefits from 
the vesting requirements, “[i]t . . . seems illogical to infer an intent to vest 
welfare benefits in every situation where an employee is eligible to receive 
them on the day he retires.”219 
The Third Circuit adopted an identical argument in Skinner.220  The court, 
after quoting Anderson’s language, stated that “we echo these concerns and 
add that the Yard-Man inference may be contrary to Congress’ intent in 
choosing specifically not to provide for the vesting of employee welfare 
benefits.”221 
 
 216. See generally Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140; and Gregory Parker Rogers, Rethinking Yard-Man: A Return to 
Fundamental Contract Principles in Retiree Benefits Litigation, 37 EMORY L.J. 1033 (1988); Cf. 
Weckstein, supra note 38, at 132 (arguing that legislation is needed to protect such benefits, but 
that a presumption against vesting benefits should be used by the courts until such legislation is 
adopted). 
 217. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517. 
 218. Id.  ERISA’s vesting requirements “shall apply to any employee benefit plan described 
in section 4(a) . . . other than an employee welfare benefit plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1994). 
 219. Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517. 
 220. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141. 
 221. Id. (citing Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517). 
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This ERISA-based argument appears to be a strong argument at first 
glance.  The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress feared that 
by allowing health insurance benefits to vest, it would cause the costs of such 
insurance to rise.222  In that case, no employer would even attempt to purchase 
such benefits.  However, after examining the language of ERISA and 
considering what the Yard-Man court really held, the criticism of the Eighth 
and Third Circuits is less convincing. 
The language of ERISA explicitly states that Congress found that “despite 
the enormous growth in [pension benefit] plans many employees with long 
years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the 
lack of vesting provisions in such plans.”223  The statute goes on to say “that 
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been 
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of 
anticipated benefits.”224  To remedy these situations in which retirees and their 
families unexpectedly lose benefits, ERISA proposed disclosure and vesting 
requirements.225  The disclosure requirements apply to health and life 
insurance benefits, but these “welfare benefits” are excluded from the vesting 
requirements.226 
Retirees obtain these benefits as employees and often believe that they are 
to last a lifetime.227  Unlike Anderson and Skinner, where it did not appear that 
the retirees ever believed the benefits were to vest, a more recent case from the 
Eighth Circuit provides a more shocking result.228  In John Morrell & Co. v. 
United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l  Union, the collective bargaining 
agreement and ERISA documents varied greatly from term to term.229  At least 
some of the agreements provided that if the retiree died, the coverage was to 
last for the lifetime of the retiree’s spouse until he or she died or remarried.230  
Even though the language seemed clear, the company was able to point to 
 
 222. See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 51 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4935 (“To 
require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and 
increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income.”). 
 223. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. § 1001(b), (c). 
 226. Compare id. § 1021 with § 1051(a). 
 227. See, e.g., Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1515; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 147; John Morrell & Co. v. 
United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d 1302, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (suggesting the retirees never objected when the company changed the 
benefits in each collective bargaining agreement signed because they believed that their right to 
health benefits previously conferred had not been diminished). 
 228. See John Morrell & Co., 37 F.3d at 1303-08. 
 229. See id. at 1303-07. 
 230. See id. at 1307. 
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other language creating an ambiguity.231  The court, citing to Anderson, found 
that the language of the collective bargaining agreements and ERISA 
documents did not show an intention of the parties to provide for vesting 
benefits.232 
While it must be conceded that ERISA does not require these benefits to 
vest, the inference is not antithetical to ERISA. 233  In addition, the Eighth 
Circuit misinterpreted the Yard-Man inference when applying the argument 
that ERISA prevents any “gratuitous inference.”234  In Anderson, the court 
began by rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Yard-Man provided for a 
presumption in favor of vesting benefits.235  In fact, Yard-Man does not 
provide for such a presumption.236  The Sixth Circuit insisted that there was 
not a presumption.237  Rather, the benefits were classified as “status benefits” 
and in light of the other evidence, the court indicated that such “status 
benefits” would raise an inference that the parties intended the benefits to 
vest.238  Thus, the retirees still maintained the burden of proof in showing that 
the parties intended the benefits to vest.239 
The Eighth Circuit then went on to make its argument that because ERISA 
explicitly exempts welfare benefits from vesting, it would be “illogical to infer 
an intent to vest welfare benefits in every situation where an employee is 
eligible to receive them on the day he retires.”240  The court indicated that 
Yard-Man created the presumption that it had previously insisted was not part 
 
 231. See id.  In particular, the court pointed out that the provisions of each collective 
bargaining agreement lacked explicit language vesting welfare benefits while pension benefits 
were explicitly vested.  See id. 
 232. See id. at 1308.  In addition, the court refused to find that Morrell breached its fiduciary 
duty under ERISA because ERISA does not prevent the employer from exercising business 
judgment, even if the employer is also acting as fiduciary under the statute.  See id. 
 233. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994). 
 234. See Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1517. 
 235. See id. at 1516-17. 
 236. See International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
v. Yard-Man, Inc. 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983); supra notes 104-108 and accompanying 
text. 
 237. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. 
 238. Id.  Standing alone, the “status benefits” would not be sufficient to create the inference 
that the parties intended the benefits to vest.  Id. 
 239. See id.  It has been argued that the practical effect of the inference is to create a 
presumption and shift the burden of proof.  Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 147.  
However, while the burden of production may switch to the employer once evidence has been 
shown to establish the inference, the burden of proof remains with the retirees to show that more 
likely than not the benefits were intended to vest.  In reality, this situation is no different from any 
breach of contract case in which the plaintiff establishes the parties’ intent. 
 240. Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1517. 
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of Yard-Man’s holding.241  Yard-Man never held that benefits should vest in 
every case.242  Rather, it was clear that the existence of “status benefits” alone 
would not be enough to even create the inference.243  Yard-Man stood for 
establishing an inference by looking at the context of the agreement.244  The 
fact that the benefits were welfare benefits was simply another factor to be 
considered in establishing that inference.245  While the congressional intent of 
ERISA may cut against the idea of a presumption of vested benefits, it 
certainly does not prevent establishing an inference such as this. 
In light of this interpretation of Yard-Man, it is no longer “illogical to infer 
an intent to vest,” even with the exemption of welfare benefits under ERISA’s 
vesting requirements.  Instead, such an inference is consistent with Congress’ 
intent to “protect . . . the interests of participants in private pension plans and 
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of 
such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of the employees.”246 
The next criticism used by the courts rejecting the Yard-Man inference is 
not as much a criticism than it is an argument against the inference.  The Third 
Circuit used it to decide Skinner.247  The Third Circuit began with Judge 
Posner’s position in Bidlack that one could argue that the union would never 
have intended vested benefits since retirees are not in the union and pay no 
dues (i.e. the union would get no benefit).248  However, one could also argue 
that because the employees know they will not be protected by the union, nor 
the NLRA once they retire, they would never intend anything but vested 
benefits upon retirement.249  Leaving the benefits open to change would leave 
retirees without protection against the company’s whims.  Judge Posner 
concluded that because both arguments could be made, no judicial 
 
 241. See id. at 1516-17.  First, the court reasoned that the Sixth Circuit only created an 
inference in Yard-Man to defeat the plaintiff’s argument that welfare benefits created a 
presumption of vested benefits.  See id.  Then, it stated that it would be “illogical to infer” vested 
benefits in every case. Id. at 1517.  That is, the court seemed to indicate that it would be illogical 
to allow the benefits alone to create a presumption of vesting.  See id. 
 242. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See id.  “Rather, as part of the context from which the collective bargaining agreement 
arose, the nature of such benefits simply provides another inference of intent.”  Id.  This was not 
the result of any special presumption, but rather, a result of the reasoning that the benefits, as 
deferred compensation, would not have been left to the irregularities of future bargaining.  See id. 
 246. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1994). 
 247. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140-41 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 248. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
 249. See id. 
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determination could be made as a matter of law.250  Rather, the Seventh Circuit 
in Bidlack remanded the case to a jury.251 
The Third Circuit reasoned differently.252  Instead of finding that both 
arguments were reasonable in determining the intent of the parties, the Third 
Circuit decided that if the parties really intended vesting benefits, then the 
language would be clear.253  If the employees knew that they would lose union 
protection upon retirement, then they “need only see to it that specific vesting 
language protecting [welfare benefits] is incorporated into the collective 
bargaining agreement.”254  Thus, there is no need for an inference or 
presumption because the employees have the burden of incorporating the 
proper language into the contract.255 
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the employees, via 
the union, knew what type of language to incorporate into the contract.  It 
starts with the proposition that if they had wanted the benefits to vest, the 
language would be there to make that happen.256  The chances are equally 
strong, if not stronger, that the employees, leaving such technicalities to the 
union, thought they were getting vested benefits.257  They may or may not have 
lobbied their union to obtain vested benefits, and upon reading the ambiguous 
language of the collective bargaining agreement and ERISA documents, 
thought that the union was successful.258  Demanding that the retirees show 
clear language makes for an efficient bright-line rule because it allows a 
determination to be made on the face of the collective bargaining agreement.  
However, it will certainly provide for harsh results in situations in which the 
retirees had believed they were to receive vested benefits and relied on that 
belief. 
 
 250. See id. at 609-10. 
 251. See id. at 610. 
 252. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141. 
 253. See id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 141-42. 
 256. See id. at 141.  Employees who want the union to bargain for continued benefits for 
retirees should include “specific language protecting those benefits” in the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id.  This is illogical for another reason.  The employee cannot “see to it” that the 
language will be placed into the agreement.  The union is the exclusive representative for the 
employee bargaining unit.  If the employer were to deal with the employee directly, it would 
violate § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 
 257. See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d 
1302, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (Heaney, J., dissenting).  Here the retirees and their spouses 
testified that they believed that the benefits were to last a lifetime and cover a retiree’s spouse in 
the event that the retiree died.  See id. at 1310. 
 258. See id. at 1313-14. 
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This rule eliminates the need to search for the parties’ intent.259  Each time 
a court determines that the language of the collective bargaining agreement is 
ambiguous, it would be impossible for the retirees to show that the parties 
intended vested benefits.  The Third Circuit actually creates a presumption that 
the parties did not intend vested benefits.260  Much like a presumption favoring 
vested benefits in every case, this opposite extreme is unconscionable.  Not 
only does it throw out Yard-Man’s inference, it throws out traditional 
contractual interpretation.261 
While some courts have not been friendly to the Yard-Man inference, the 
criticism continued in the commentary following the initial decision.262  Some 
of these criticisms present valid points, but none successfully present an 
argument against using an inference as an added factor in deciding the intent of 
the parties. 
B. Criticisms from Academic Commentary 
Donald Weckstein, an expert in labor and collective bargaining issues, 
criticized the congressional response to the problems of non-vesting 
benefits.263  However, he was quick to criticize Yard-Man despite his concern 
for protecting retirees and their needed welfare benefits.264  He accepted the 
public policy needs for an inference as created in Yard-Man, but attacked the 
deferred compensation analysis.265 
Weckstein reasoned that the Yard-Man court was correct in concluding 
that sometimes retiree health benefits are taken in lieu of additional 
compensation such as wages or immediate benefits.266  He went on to argue, 
however, that “the current employees may not have acted on the assumption 
that, once granted, retiree health and welfare benefits may not be reconsidered 
 
 259. See generally International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that once 
it has been established that a contract is ambiguous, the court should then seek to discern the 
intent of the parties). 
 260. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.  See also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp. 493 F.2d 603, 607 
(7th Cir. 1993).  In Bidlack, the court refused to establish a rule requiring clear language to 
establish vested benefits.  See id.  “[C]ourts should be cautious about adding formal hoops that 
contract parties must jump through. . . .”  Id. 
 261. See generally Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479-80.  The Sixth Circuit clearly presented the 
traditional contract principles needed for the analysis.  See id.  See also notes 74-81 and 
accompanying text. 
 262. See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 38, at 128-32; Rogers, supra note 216, at 1054-56. 
 263. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 133-36.  Weckstein indicated that Congress had made 
“step[s] in the right direction, but [Congress was] still a long way from a solution.”  Id. at 135. 
 264. See id. at 130-32, 134. 
 265. See id. at 128-31. 
 266. See id. at 130. 
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at future bargaining sessions when conditions have changed.”267  Thus, the 
deferred compensation analysis requires the court to assume too much 
regarding the union’s and employees’ intent.268 
Weckstein then turned his attention to the Weimer court’s use of this 
analysis.269  There, the Sixth Circuit made the statement that because the 
benefits were viewed as deferred compensation, and because the parties could 
not have left them to the uncertainties of future bargaining, the welfare benefits 
were normally vested.270  Weckstein insisted that Yard-Man never stood for 
such an analysis.271  He insisted that this expands Yard-Man and “ignores the 
statutory distinction made in ERISA . . . between pension retirement benefits, 
which do normally vest, and welfare retirement benefits which do not vest 
absent a contractual undertaking of that nature.”272 
First, Weckstein is correct that the statement from Weimer is an undue 
expansion of the Yard-Man inference.273  This statement may be the reason 
why the courts have dismissed Yard-Man as a presumption rather than a mere 
inference to be considered with other factors in determining intent.274  
However, it has already been shown that the Weimer court, while making such 
a statement, really continued to apply the Yard-Man inference correctly.275  
That is, it considered it in addition to other factors in determining that the 
parties intended the benefits to vest.276 
Next, Weckstein raised a valid point in regard to the deferred 
compensation analysis, but his attack was too extreme.277  Perhaps a party 
would be willing to accept benefits left to the uncertainties of later 
bargaining.278  Indeed, the union may not have been able to obtain the vested 
language from the employer.  If this is the case, then the interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement raises the possibility of an illusory 
provision.279  The courts have always shied away from interpreting an 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. See generally Weckstein, supra note 38, at 130 (“The difficulty with this analysis is that 
it proves too much, some of which does not logically follow.”). 
 269. See id. at 131. 
 270. Id. (citing Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 271. See id.  After quoting from Weimer, Weckstein insisted that “Yard-Man did not make 
any such statement.”  Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140.  “We cannot agree with Yard-Man and its progeny that 
there exists a presumption of lifetime benefits in the context of employee welfare benefits.”  Id. 
 275. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 130. 
 278. See id. (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 n.8). 
 279. See generally, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 
1917).  It is conceded that providing some benefits is better than no benefits.  However, there is 
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agreement in such a way because it is difficult to believe that any party would 
engage in such a one-sided deal.280  Thus, the deferred compensation analysis, 
though requiring the court to assume that parties would not enter into a one-
sided agreement, is not so unreasonable as to avoid using it.  In addition, any 
questionable assumption is outweighed by the courts’ use of other factors in 
determining the parties’ intent.  Again, the Yard-Man inference was only one 
factor among many pointing to an intent to vest benefits. 281 
The courts and commentators have been creative in attacking Yard-Man’s 
analysis.  At the same time, very little has been suggested as an alternative to 
avoiding the harsh results that are possible when the inference is not used.  
Alternatives that have been suggested do not prevent unconscionable results or 
have not been adopted by the courts or legislatures. 
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO 
RETIREES 
Perhaps the best argument for preserving the Yard-Man decision is that any 
alternative analyses of problems involving the termination of welfare benefits 
are insufficient to protect the interest of the parties.  Current judicial 
alternatives range from requiring specific language formulae282 to using pure 
contractual analyses such as equitable estoppel.283  As with the criticism of 
Yard-Man, a cross-section of these alternatives will be evaluated based on their 
ability to provide efficient results, protect the retirees and protect the ability of 
employers to continue providing benefits to retirees. 
 
nothing keeping an employer in the Third and Eighth Circuits from terminating the welfare 
benefits being paid to retirees immediately upon termination of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140-41; Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 
1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).  While some of the current employees covered by the pertinent 
collective bargaining agreement will retire during the term of the agreement, other employees, 
perhaps even a majority, that presumably gave up the same compensation, would never see the 
compensation deferred to retirement.  It is not being argued that employers must grant vested 
benefits in every case.  Rather, the employees should not be misled into believing that they are 
receiving lifetime benefits when they are not.  The deferred compensation analysis is only part of 
the reasoning in raising the inference.  See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.  Ultimately, it is only a 
single part of the Yard-Man analysis.  Id. 
 280. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 493 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993).  The Seventh Circuit 
used this to reason that courts will, on occasion, look outside the terms of the contract to imply 
meaning.  Id. 
 281. The Yard-Man court used a number of factors in determining that the parties must have 
intended the benefits to vest.  See supra notes 61-108 and accompanying text. 
 282. See, e.g., Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607. 
 283. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151-52; Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072-74.  See also 
Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 150-152. 
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A. Language Formulae 
In approaching a situation in which an employer has terminated welfare 
benefits, a court may consider a number of possibilities for analysis.284  While 
it is has not been a choice, even for the courts most skeptical of retiree claims, 
one of these possibilities is requiring specific language in order to vest 
benefits.285  That is, a court may hold that there will not be vested benefits 
unless the collective bargaining agreement uses the words, “vested benefits” or 
“benefits for the life of the retiree.”  If this was the case, retirees would seldom 
be able to bring a claim under § 301 of the NLRMA.286  The outcome of any 
case could be pre-determined. 
This analysis would provide efficient results.  The courts could decide a 
claim without considering the role and impact of a jury in the proceedings.287  
Judges could rule as a matter of law because they would need to only look for 
the prescribed formula.  If that formula was not present, then the retirees could 
not succeed under § 301. 
This efficiency is outweighed by the harsh results generated by such 
formalism.  Even when the language indicates that welfare benefits are to vest, 
the retirees could not recover unless the prescribed formula was present.  In 
Bidlack, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “[i]t is one thing for a court to lay down 
default rules to solve contractual disputes when the parties’ intentions cannot 
be determined. . . .  It is another thing for us to say to the contract parties, we 
can see what you’re driving at but as you have not used our preferred form of 
words we shall not enforce your contract.”288 
The courts developed the idea of consideration to show that the contract 
should be enforced rather than prescribed formulae.289  Even if it is apparent 
that the parties did not intend vested benefits, the collective bargaining 
agreement is enforceable because the current employees are providing 
consideration through their labor.  Thus, requiring specific words for the 
benefits to vest is simply not appropriate.290 
 
 284. See, e.g., Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 145-52.  Melbinger and Culver 
consider six different analyses, but draw no conclusions.  Id.  Rather, their article was merely a 
survey of the status of the issue in the early 1990s.  Id. 
 285. See generally Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607.  The Seventh Circuit eventually rejected this 
analysis as an extreme position.  Id. 
 286. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994). 
 287. See generally Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607-09 (rejecting this analysis, a presumption in favor 
of vested benefits, and remanding the case for a jury to decide). 
 288. Id. at 607. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See id. 
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B. Equitable Estoppel 
Another option available to the courts would be to use a pure contractual 
analysis.291  Some of the commentators and courts have suggested that 
equitable estoppel is sufficient to protect the retirees and provide for efficient 
results.292 
Often employers become confused after they leave the bargaining table.  
The negotiators may not have intended for the benefits to vest.  At a 
subsequent time, some authorized agent of the employer will explain to 
employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement that they have been 
provided with lifetime welfare benefits.293  Another common occurrence is that 
the employer continues to provide welfare benefits to retirees for years after 
the collective bargaining agreement in question has expired.294 
In an argument criticizing the Yard-Man analysis, Gregory Parker Rogers 
argued that equitable estoppel was a “rational alternative” to the “strained 
contract interpretation” of Yard-Man.295  Thus, if an employee reasonably 
relies on a promise of lifetime benefits from a company agent, then the 
employer should be “estopped from standing on the contract terms.”296  The 
only danger pointed out by Rogers is in avoiding the enforcement of promises 
on which no reasonable person would rely.297 
Unfortunately, when this analysis is applied to real situations, the results 
are sometimes too harsh.  For example, in a case involving an employer who 
unilaterally terminated medical benefits, the Third Circuit discussed the 
possibility of an equitable estoppel analysis.298  In In re Unisys Corp. Retiree 
Med Benefit “ERISA” Litig, the retirees were denied recovery under equitable 
estoppel.299  In that case, the company distributed summary plan descriptions 
pursuant to ERISA § 1021(a)300 which contained a provision reserving the 
 
 291. See Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 150-52. 
 292. See Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072-74. 
 293. See id. at 1072. 
 294. See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d 
1302, 1305-06 (8th Cir. 1994).  John Morrell & Co. went so far as to continue providing retirees 
with health insurance benefits even when the union went on strike and welfare benefits were 
terminated for active employees.  Id. at 1306.  The Eighth Circuit did not use an equitable 
estoppel analysis however.  See id. at 1302-07. 
 295. Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072. 
 296. Id. at 1073. 
 297. See id. 
 298. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 907 (3rd Cir. 
1995).  In this case, the court dealt only with ERISA and did not address a Yard-Man analysis 
because there was no collective bargaining agreement involved.  See id. at 898-900.  Instead, the 
retirees claimed to have relied on words in the summary plan description, which indicated the 
benefits would be vested “for life.”  Id. at 898. 
 299. See id. at 908. 
 300. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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right to terminate in the employer, but also included words indicating that the 
benefits were “for life.”301 
The court listed the elements of equitable estoppel.302  The plaintiff had to 
show a material misrepresentation on the part of the company and reasonable, 
detrimental reliance on that misrepresentation.303  Because of the provision in 
the summary plan description reserving the right to terminate, the court 
determined that the retirees could not have reasonably relied on the other 
language.304  The court stated: “While we acknowledge that many retirees may 
have relied to their detriment on their interpretation of the summary plan 
descriptions as promising vested or lifetime benefits, we nonetheless must 
reject their estoppel claim.”305 
Likewise, in Skinner, the Third Circuit concluded that the retirees could 
not recover under equitable estoppel.306  In this case, the retirees had failed to 
show detrimental reliance or other extraordinary circumstances.307  As the 
court noted, “[h]ere, the appellants have presented no evidence which supports 
an inference of bad faith and/or fraudulent conduct on the part of the 
[employer], misrepresentations over an extended course of dealing, or the 
particular vulnerability of the appellants.”308 
Showing reliance on company promises is almost impossible.  The reliance 
must be reasonable.309  Thus, it is almost necessary for a retiree to be told by a 
company executive during an exit interview that welfare benefits are to last a 
lifetime in order to pursue a claim under equitable estoppel.310  Though there 
are probably no studies dealing with this issue, it is likely that companies 
seldom send top executives to conduct exit interviews, but that does not mean 
a retiree does not reasonably rely on what he or she is told.311 
Likewise, it is also difficult to show reasonable reliance on language in a 
summary plan description.  A retiree could not make an argument of 
reasonable reliance unless the documents were clear that the benefits were to 
 
 301. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 898. 
 302. See id. at 907 (citing Curcio v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3rd Cir. 
1994)); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3rd Cir. 1993)). 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 152 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151 (citing Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907; 
Curcio, 33 F.3d at 235). 
 310. See Rogers, supra note 216, at 1073. 
 311. “Courts must be careful . . . not to enforce promises on which no reasonable person 
would rely.  If the [person conducting an exit interview] has no such authority [to explain that 
benefits are to last a lifetime], then retirees should not rely on these promises.”  Id. 
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vest.312  If the description contained conflicting language, then the retiree was 
not reasonable in relying on words that do indicate lifetime benefits.313  Thus, 
the summary plan description would have to be clear in providing vested 
benefits.  It is then questionable whether or not a retiree could reasonably rely 
on such language if a separate document (i.e. a collective bargaining 
agreement) contained conflicting language.314  Regardless, the employer will 
almost always be able to create an argument against the reasonable reliance of 
the retiree.  “Clear language addressed to the employer’s right to terminate or 
modify its obligation to continue health and welfare benefits for retirees . . . is 
the exception.  And even when it does occur, other actions or language of the 
employer may create an ambiguity.”315 
While the efficiency of the equitable estoppel analysis is not a problem, it 
simply is not sufficient to protect the retirees from harsh consequences.  The 
union conducts negotiations in lieu of the employees.316  If the employees had 
directly negotiated with the employer and settled on the contract provisions, 
then maybe the equitable estoppel analysis would make more sense.317  
Instead, the employee, who will later be the retiree, is left to rely on what the 
union and company tells the employees regarding the status of welfare benefits 
under a collective bargaining agreement.  Still, once the bargaining agreement 
is executed, the employees are held to the terms of the agreement, even if they 
disagree with the terms.318  Thus, a retiree could seldom satisfy the reasonable 
reliance requirement of equitable estoppel, even if there was actual reliance on 
 
 312. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907-08. 
 313. See id. at 907. 
 314. Skinner would suggest that an employee cannot reasonably rely upon language in one 
document when there is language in another indicating that the company reserved the right to 
terminate the benefits.  See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151-52.  However, Skinner does not provide a 
clear answer because, while there was language in the summary plan descriptions reserving a 
right to terminate, the summary plan descriptions were never distributed to the employees or 
retirees.  See id. at 152.  Thus, the court instead decided that equitable estoppel was not possible 
because there was no evidence of reliance on the language in the collective bargaining agreement 
indicating that benefits were vested and there were no extraordinary circumstances.  See id. 
 315. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 120. 
 316. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). 
 317. In that situation, there would be a reason to consider reliance on language unreasonable 
when there is conflicting language.  However, when the union negotiates, the employees cannot 
be expected to be experts on the language of the collective bargaining agreement and ERISA 
documents.  That’s what they select the union to do.  Id. 
 318. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65-70 (1975).  
The Supreme Court has held that the employees are bound by the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement even if they are challenging the employer’s discriminatory practices.  Id. 
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the words of the employer, summary plan description, or collective bargaining 
agreement.319 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA 
The final analysis to be evaluated has also been discussed by courts 
rejecting Yard-Man.  This analysis is based on the creation of a fiduciary duty 
under ERISA.  When an employer establishes a benefits plan, it must be 
administered under ERISA.320  The administrator maintains a fiduciary duty to 
the plan participants.321  Thus, the employer may actually have a double 
relationship with the employees under a plan: employer-employee and a 
fiduciary relationship.322 
A fiduciary must discharge the plan only in the interest of the 
participants.323  The argument presented by retirees having their benefits 
terminated is that the employer breached its fiduciary duties when it led them 
to believe that they were receiving a vested benefit.324  The courts generally 
hold that an employer who affirmatively misleads plan participants breaches 
the fiduciary duty required by ERISA.325  The retirees can argue that they were 
affirmatively misled, and thus, the employer acted to the detriment of the plan 
participants in allowing the retirees to believe the benefits were vested when 
they were not.326 
It would appear that this presents a safety valve, eliminating the need for 
the Yard-Man inference.  After all, ERISA was meant to cover and protect 
pension and benefit plans.  Retirees pursuing this route have been 
unsuccessful.327  Even presuming a retiree could show that the employer 
 
 319. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151; Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907; Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999 
F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that all the plan participants should have known that the 
employer could modify the terms according to the provisions of the plan). 
 320. See Janilyn S. Brouwer, Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise of a Lifetime? 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 985, 990 (1990). 
 321. See id.  A fiduciary is anyone who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of [a benefits] plan or exercises any authority or control 
respecting management or disposition of its assets.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). 
 322. See Amato v. Western Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416 (2nd Cir. 1985); Fischer v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
 323. See 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (1994); Skinner, 188 F.3d at 148. 
 324. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 248. 
 325. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 148.  Generally, to make out a claim for breach of a fiduciary 
duty, the Third Circuit requires a showing of: (1) the employer acted as a fiduciary, (2) the 
employer/fiduciary made affirmative misrepresentations, (3) the fiduciary knew it was confusing 
participants, and (4) the participants were harmed.  Id. 
 326. See Brouwer, supra note 320, at 991. 
 327. See id.  See also Ossi, supra note 55, at 248 (arguing that retirees are unsuccessful with 
this analysis with or without provisions expressly providing for the employer’s reserved right to 
amend or terminate the benefit). 
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misled the plan participants without showing the benefits are actually vested, 
the courts, through interpretation of the fiduciary duty and ERISA 
requirements, have made it nearly impossible to obtain equitable relief under 
the fiduciary duty analysis.328  Generally, to raise a breach of fiduciary duty, 
retirees would have to show that the employer misled them into believing that 
benefits were vested, and then terminated the benefits. 
First, in Amato v. Western Union Int’l, the Second Circuit allowed the 
employer to distinguish acts committed as the fiduciary and acts committed as 
the employer.329  In general, an employer should not be prevented from 
deciding what benefits are to confer.330  Thus, if the employer decides not to 
confer any benefits, the employee has no recourse.331  This is a decision 
employers are allowed to make.  Likewise, if the employer decides to modify 
benefits that have not been vested, then the employer has not breached a 
fiduciary duty because the employer has not acted as a plan administrator and 
owes no fiduciary duty.332  Because of this precedent, retirees could not claim 
breach of the fiduciary duty for simply terminating the benefits.333  In addition, 
to argue that the employer breached a fiduciary duty by cutting or modifying 
benefits that were vested begs the question of whether the benefits were vested 
in the first place.  The question of the Yard-Man inference would still be 
unresolved. 
In order to state a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty, the courts 
have created elements that make it just as difficult to bring it as a claim under 
equitable estoppel.334  In fact, the courts look for many of the same elements to 
establish both.335  In Skinner, the court listed the elements needed to bring a 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.336  One of the elements that must be 
shown is that the “company made affirmative misrepresentations or failed to 
adequately inform plan participants and beneficiaries.”337 
In Skinner, the court refused to find an affirmative misrepresentation even 
though the employees actually believed the benefits were to vest under the 
 
 328. See supra notes 324-27. 
 329. See Amato, 773 F.2d at 1416; Brouwer, supra note 320, at 991. 
 330. See id. at 991. 
 331. See id. 
 332. See id. at 991-92. 
 333. If an employer decides to cut welfare benefits, a fiduciary duty claim cannot be brought 
because the employer was not acting as the plan administrator when the benefits were cut.  See id. 
at 991.  “The courts have decided that modifying the terms of employee benefit plans is an 
‘employer’ function.”  Id. 
 334. See supra notes 291-319 and accompanying text. 
 335. Compare supra notes 291-319 and accompanying text with supra notes 320-36 and 
accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 325. 
 337. International Union, United Auto., Acrospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. 
Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 148 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
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plan.338  The court found that there was no evidence showing that the employer 
placed the thought in the employees’ mind.339  Nor was there evidence that the 
employer stood silent while knowing that the employees believed they were to 
receive vested benefits.340  Because of this, there could be no breach of a 
fiduciary duty under ERISA.341 
Under Skinner, it seems that in order to bring a breach of fiduciary duty, 
the retirees, prior to retirement, have to ask the employer whether or not the 
benefits vested and the employer has to give an affirmative response.342  
Employees who believe they are going to receive vested benefits would have 
no reason to ask such a question.  Employers, even if they believe benefits are 
supposed to vest, can avoid liability under a fiduciary duty analysis by keeping 
quiet.343  The analysis will only prevent incidents of the employer making 
explicit statements that the benefits are to vest, but those situations are rare as 
demonstrated by the multitude of litigation making its way to the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals.344 
Because other judicial alternatives do not provide an acceptable 
alternative, the next question that arises is whether the Yard-Man inference is 
acceptable, or whether a legislative alternative is needed.  One must answer 
both questions affirmatively.  The Yard-Man inference is acceptable.  At the 
same time, legislation could clarify the positions the employer and union 
should take in negotiation regarding such benefits.  Legislation could also 
better protect health and life insurance benefits that retirees believe are to last a 
lifetime.  Perhaps it would allow all parties involved to avoid the harsh 
consequence of being forced into court each time an employer, for whatever 
reason, decides to cut benefits. 
V. THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE SERVING AS A SUBSTITUTE UNTIL 
LEGISLATION IS AVAILABLE TO PROTECT RETIREES 
The thrust of this Comment has been to establish the validity of the Yard-
Man inference through a critique of its criticisms and the shortcomings of 
judicial alternatives.345  In fact, the Yard-Man inference can stand on its own as 
a valid principle.  Currently, it is the only choice retirees have to challenge an 
improper termination of benefits.  However, because the employers and union 
 
 338. See id. at 150-51. 
 339. See id. at 150. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at 150. 
 342. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 150-51.  The retirees would also have had a claim if the 
employer went about making explicit statements that the benefits were to vest upon retirement.  
See id. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See supra notes 61-215 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra notes 216-344 and accompanying text. 
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should be able to enter negotiations knowing the status of welfare benefits, this 
should not be an invitation to abandon calls for legislation to remedy the 
situations discussed. 
A. The Yard-Man as a Valid Principle of Interpretation 
Critics of the inference focus on the dangers of a “presumption” that 
benefits vest.346  It has been demonstrated that the Yard-Man decision did not 
establish such a presumption.347  Instead, the burdens of persuasion and 
production of evidence remain with the retirees in establishing that the benefits 
vested upon retirement.  The Yard-Man inference is only a factor contributing 
to a general inference that benefits in a specific situation were to vest upon 
retirement.348  Employers should not fear Yard-Man.  Because it is only an 
inference, rather than a presumption, finders of fact would be free to reject the 
inference of vested benefits.  Thus, the inference only works to preserve a 
promise made to retirees before they retired.  It acts only as an additional tool 
in discerning the intent of the parties. 
Perhaps the courts could run wild with the inference and establish a 
presumption that benefits are to vest in every situation.  However, it has been 
shown that this has not happened in the Sixth Circuit, even though the court 
has adopted broader language when discussing the law.349  The application of 
the law has remained the same.350 
One drawback to the inference is that anytime there is an alleged wrongful 
termination of benefits, retirees must fight the employer in the courts.  The 
union no longer has a duty to represent the retirees.351  Even though the union 
may find it in its interest to help its former members along, retirees may have 
to fight alone.  For retirees and employers alike, this presents huge legal fees.  
This is a harsh reality of solving the problem through the courts.  Despite the 
validity of the inference, legislation is needed.  Any legislation should allow 
the employer and employee to know ahead of time whether or not benefits are 
going to vest in the employee upon retirement.  Current legislation is simply 
inadequate.352 
 
 346. See supra notes 217-81 and accompanying text. 
 347. See id. 
 348. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
168 (1971). 
 352. See infra notes 353-64 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Inadequacy of Current Legislation and the Search for Other 
Alternatives 
From the analysis thus far, it is clear that ERISA does not solve the 
problem of Yard-Man.  ERISA does not require the vesting of welfare benefits, 
and its fiduciary duty requirements do not provide retirees with a remedy.353  
Commentators on ERISA have admitted as such.354  Knowing that retirees 
were facing serious problems trying to afford health care, Congress went back 
to the drawing board. 
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) was 
passed to provide protection against the unilateral termination of health 
insurance benefits.355  The law requires that retirees be allowed to continue 
participating in the group health insurance plan provided to active employees 
for eighteen months after separating from employment.356  Thus, retirees were 
given at least eighteen months to find new coverage.  This was positive 
legislation in light of the confusion among the circuits regarding whether and 
when welfare benefits should vest.357 
COBRA only gives protection for eighteen months.358  Retirees will then 
have to find new coverage.  The expense of health insurance, even coverage 
supplemental to Medicare, looms for a retiree losing benefits at the end of the 
eighteen months.359 
Next, COBRA does not require employers to continue paying for retirees’ 
coverage.  Rather, it only requires that retirees be allowed to participate in the 
coverage provided to active employees at the group rate.360  Thus, while this 
coverage will be cheaper than other insurance, the retiree is still required to 
pay the premiums.  In addition, the employer may charge a 2% surcharge.361  
 
 353. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying text. 
 354. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 249; Brouwer, supra note 320, at 992.  In addition, at least 
one commentator argued that “E.R.I.S.A. provides little control over employers’ self interested 
behavior and arguably has been interpreted by courts as a protective cover for employer decisions 
that are decidedly harmful to their employee-principals where health insurance benefits are 
concerned.”  Dayna Bowen Matthew,  Article: Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of 
Employment-Based Health Insurance:Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1067 (1996). 
 355. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272.  See also 
Weckstein, supra note 38, at 134-35. 
 356. See id. at 134-45. 
 357. See id. 
 358. See id. 
 359. See id. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employer 
Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 84 (1987). 
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Thus, the retiree still has to pay 102% of the cost of health insurance after 
retirement.362 
In recent years, legislation has been introduced that would prevent 
employers from terminating benefits when retirees challenged the company’s 
obligations in court.363  In addition, the legislation also placed the burden of 
persuasion on the employer to prove that the termination was allowed by 
ERISA documents or collective bargaining agreement.364  This type of 
legislation has failed to muster enough votes on two separate occasions.365 
The failure of this legislation is a disappointment for retirees.  Like 
COBRA, it would be a step in the right direction.  This would encourage 
employers to be clear about the benefits from the beginning.  Thus, the union 
could better negotiate for the vested benefits at the bargaining table.  It would 
not necessarily chill offers of welfare benefits because it is not an absolute 
vesting requirement.366  Neither would it require an employer to bargain over 
retirement benefits in the first place.  It only requires continuing benefits if the 
retirees challenge the employer’s obligations until a court can resolve the issue.  
In addition, negotiators for both unions and employers could establish 
positions knowing who would have the burden of proof if a dispute was to 
arise.  While the law would still require going to court, the retirees would be 
better protected because they would maintain the benefits until the case was 
decided. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is easy to argue that the problem of Yard-Man is not a problem because 
Medicare acts as a retirees’ safety net.  That is, if a retiree loses health 
insurance from a former employer, Medicare is there to soften the blow.  
However, Medicare is inadequate.367  Retirees must find supplemental 
coverage for anything that Medicare does not cover. 
The Yard-Man inference is necessary to prevent employers from breaking 
a promise of lifetime benefits.  When the employer allows its employees to 
believe they are receiving vested health insurance benefits, the employer 
should be held accountable when it attempts to terminate those benefits after 
the collective bargaining agreement expires.  The Yard-Man inference adds to 
 
 362. See id.  See also Weckstein, supra note 38, at 135. 
 363. Retiree Health Benefits Protection Act, S. 1268, 104th Cong. (1993). See also Ossi, 
supra note 55, at 256. 
 364. See id. at 256. 
 365. See id. 
 366. Presumably, if an employer knows that benefits have to vest, the issue would never reach 
the bargaining table.  As a permissive subject of bargaining under the NLRA, the employer has 
no duty to bargain for the retiree benefits.  Rather, whether such benefits enter negotiations is a 
function of the bargaining power and desires of the union.  Id. 
 367. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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the factors that can be shown by a retiree trying to demonstrate what the parties 
actually meant when the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated.  
Employers should not fear a situation in which they end up paying for benefits 
when such benefits were never promised.  The existence of the benefits alone 
is not enough to establish vested benefits.  Retirees still bear the burden of 
proof and production of the original intent of the employer and union.  The 
finder of fact can then determine whether to accept or reject the inference 
based on the credibility of the parties. 
ERISA and COBRA are positive laws that provide some assistance, but 
they do not solve the problems faced by retirees and employers in a Yard-Man 
situation.368  Courts should continue using the Sixth Circuit inference.  It is 
possible that the inference will not be enough to demonstrate vested benefits, 
and the retirees will suffer the loss of benefits.  Regardless, it is imperative that 
the circuits stop mowing over Yard-Man until alternative legislation is 
possible. 
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